RAND commitments-i.e., promises to license on reasonable and non-discriminatory termsplay a key role in standard setting processes. However, the usefulness of those commitments has recently been questioned. The problem allegedly lies in the absence of a generally agreed test to determine whether a particular license satisfies a RAND commitment. Swanson and Baumol have suggested that "the concept of a 'reasonable' royalty for purposes of RAND licensing must be defined and implemented by reference to ex ante competition." In their opinion, a royalty should be deemed "reasonable" when it approximates the outcome of an ex ante auction process where IP owners submit RAND commitments coupled with licensing terms and selection to the standard is based on both technological merit and licensing terms. In this paper we investigate whether the ex ante auction approach proposed by Swanson and Baumol is likely to deliver efficient outcomes, both from static and dynamic standpoints. We find that given the peculiar characteristics of some of the industries where standardization takes place, in particular the many different business models adopted by innovating companies in those industries, the ex ante auction approach proposed by Swanson and Baumol may not always deliver the right outcomes from a social welfare viewpoint.
I. INTRODUCTION
The adoption of proprietary technologies by standard-setting organizations (SSOs) is often necessary to ensure that the resulting standard provides the greatest possible value to its users and, therefore, to guarantee the success of the standardization process. However, some claim that the selection of proprietary technologies as standards may also create significant market power, generate returns in excess of those needed to remunerate innovation, distort competition and restrict the dissemination of new and superior technologies. A necessary (but not sufficient) condition for the creation of ex post (i.e., attributable to the standard selection) market power is the absence of alternative technologies that can be substituted for the selected technology at comparable user costs.
2 When such alternative technologies are available, an SSO's endorsement of a proprietary technology as a standard may result in a reduction of (short-term) competition in the technology market. Otherwise, the selection process will have no adverse effect on technological competition.
SSOs typically request the owners of technologies selected to be part of the standard to commit to license their intellectual property (IP) on reasonable and nondiscriminatory (RAND) terms. There is a dispute about what a RAND commitment means in practice. Some authors argue that it simply represents a commitment to negotiate in "good faith" with all potential licensees. 3 Others interpret a RAND commitment as a waiver by an essential IP holder of its right to seek injunctive relief in case of patent infringement. 4 Some companies and their advisors have gone as far concept of a 'reasonable' royalty for the purposes of RAND licensing must be defined and implemented by reference to ex ante competition." In sharp contrast to some authors, 11 Swanson and Baumol "rule out defining a reasonable RAND royalty as the royalty that would be observed in the event that the prospective licensees were to band together (either before or after standard selection) and act as a buyers'
cartel." 12 Such a cartel would raise a host of problems, including undercompensation for patent holders as IP buyers pressed for unfairly low licensing terms. Instead, they propose that SSOs conduct ex ante auctions of their standards. IP owners would submit RAND commitments coupled with licensing terms and the selection process would be based on technological merit and licensing terms. there are several "available IP options"-that is, when there is competition ex ante among feasible substitute technologies so that selection to the standard may create market power ex post. This means that auctions will not be of help in potentially many cases. Lastly, but not less importantly, Swanson and Baumol recognise that the ex ante auction process needs to be "appropriately designed" to ensure that it produces reasonable results. Not every auction-like process may do the job from a RAND standpoint. In fact, they suggest the adoption of the so-called "sealed bid" auction model, 14 where IP owners would simultaneously submit best and final offers.
The winning IP holder is the one which offers the best technology-price proposition.
In this paper we will focus on this last aspect of the Swanson and Baumol proposed definition of RAND licensing terms. Is the auction-like process proposed by these authors likely to yield efficient outcomes? That is, is it likely to compensate innovators and hence preserve the incentives to invest and innovate in new technologies? Is it likely to keep the cost of the selected technologies under control so as to ensure their optimal diffusion ex post? And lastly, would SSOs using ex ante auctions select the most efficient technologies, i.e., those that create most value for their users at a reasonable cost?
We show that Swanson and Baumol's emphasis on the design of the auction process is justified. Given the peculiar characteristics of the industries where standardization takes place (telecoms, semi-conductors, audio-visual, etc.) as well as the many different business models adopted by companies in those industries, some auction formats (e.g., a sealed-bid auction) may be preferable to others (e.g. an open ascending auction) in an economic sense. Unfortunately, however, no auction format-including the sealed-bid auction proposed by Swanson and Baumol-is likely to yield efficient outcomes once the specific characteristics of these industries and the asymmetric nature of the companies that operate in them is fully taken into account.
For example, regardless of its design an ex ante auction may produce inefficient results when the competing technologies are in the hands of both vertically integrated and non-integrated companies. We show that the dual role of vertically integrated companies in the standard setting process-innovators and users-places them at a competitive advantage in the auction process. The analytical framework developed by Swanson and Baumol provides useful guidance on the meaning of RAND licensing. We concur with their claim that concerns about the opportunistic exploitation of ex post market power "will be magnified if the IP owner is also a participant in the downstream market" 19 and with their suggestion that a "non-discriminatory" license fee should satisfy the "efficient 15 The "winner's curse" is a term used to describe a phenomenon in common-value auctions and bidding behavior. When a bidder wins an auction, it suggests that other bidders had lower valuations, indicating that the winning bid is very likely to be an overbid, resulting in an expected loss. note that an auction-like process would harm innovation by creating monopsony power. 36 As they observe, "In the case of the typical SSO, however, the integration and efficiencies needed to justify outright collective bargaining on royalties are in short supply." 37 Thus, instead of efficiencies, the outcome is likely to be undercompensation for innovation. We agree, and would add that even when these conditions are met, an auction-like process may still harm innovation, as we will explain below.
First let us consider each of these three conditions carefully. The first condition requires SSO members to "credibly commit" and adhere to the auction mechanism initially adopted. Full commitment is a critical assumption in auction theory; but one that does not necessarily hold in practice. Economic theory has
shown that the party who designs the auction has generally the incentive to change the auction rules in the middle of the play. And in many circumstances it may also have the ability to do so. Vartianen (2005) describes the commitment problem as 32 Swanson & Baumol, supra note 2, at 21. 33 Id. at 17. 34 Id. 35 Id. 36 Id. 37 Id. at 13.
"pathological". 38 He shows that when the parties cannot commit themselves to the auction mechanism, the English (or open ascending) auction is the only feasible procedure. In particular, the sealed-bid auction proposed by Swanson and Baumol is not feasible in the absence of commitment power. The alternative, an English auction format may, as we will see below, facilitate the adoption of collusive or predatory strategies; which could be the reason why Swanson and Baumol proposed a sealedbid auction instead.
The second condition, which assumes that the SSO voting mechanism cannot be skewed by an individual member or subset of members, also may be problematic.
This follows because, in practice, some SSO members-those that are vertically integrated-are also the owners of some of the competing technologies. Hence, these vertically integrated firms will have the incentive, and sometimes also the ability, to tailor the selection mechanism in their favour. For example, they may find it easier to win the auction (bid low) and have their technologies selected to the standard because, as noted earlier, they can earn profits downstream. be an attractive option. But for products that are core, this will not be viable at all. In many industries, not participating in the standard setting efforts can effectively shut a firm out of a market altogether. This is apparently the case for 802.11 technologies.
For any firm that wants to offer products or help direct the evolution of wireless networking, participation in the IEEE standard setting efforts is mandatory.
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It is thus unrealistic to suggest that licensors disgruntled with an SSO's rules or procedures should simply leave. One must first ask whether, in the particular circumstances at hand, leaving is even an available choice. This is of great practical importance: the ability to walk away from a deal is a key determinant of a firm's 40 For example, in mobile telecoms two competing standards, CDMA and GSM, compete for operator networks and, through them for end users. 41 For example, in the case of 802.11n, a standardization effort formed outside of the IEEE, known as the EWC. Though the group was comprised of vendors with "90 percent of the market" and it seemed they could proceed without the involvement of an official standard setting body, the group still pushed for the approval and involvement of the IEEE. In sum, none of the three conditions is trivial. The model that Swanson and Baumol present is eloquent and informative, but there are reasons to believe that one or more of their three conditions may fail in any given real-world standard-setting process. Hence, there is a serious risk that the result of the auction process would lead to collective price negotiation that in turn under-compensated patent holders and reduced incentives for innovation. These are, however, not the only difficulties faced by the ex ante auction approach, as we explain in the remainder of this section.
A. Alternative auction mechanisms
If the values of the competing technologies are private information (i.e., known only to the technology holder)-as they are likely to be-the outcome of a standards auction, and consequently the use of such ex ante royalty rates as a benchmark as well, will be a function of the precise auction mechanism adopted by the SSO. In conclusion, the outcome of an SSO-sponsored auction will depend on its precise design. Which design is more efficient depends critically on fine details about the values of the technologies of the competing IP owners, which in reality will only 46 To use an analogy from first semester statistics class, the two assumptions describe the process of pulling a marble from an urn, observing whether it is black or white, and then returning it to the urn. Each draw from the urn is unaffected by previous or subsequent draws and each draw has the same odds of producing a black versus a white marble. This is typically not the case with technologies in real world standards. There, some common factors affect each draw, so that the draws are no longer independent. 47 competitors by observing the points at which they stop bidding. 53 Finally, though sealed-bid auctions make collusion and predation less likely, they do not eliminate those risks entirely.
B. Asymmetric bidders
A key assumption in the basic auction model analysed by Swanson and Baumol is that all patent owners are vertically disintegrated-i.e., they are pure innovators. In reality, however, both non-integrated firms and firms with both The literature has established that the presence of a toehold has two effects on bidding behaviour. 55 The first is a direct effect: a toehold changes a bidder's valuation because a share of the auction prize flows back to him through his stake in the prize. In other words, having a toehold makes winning the auction more valuable so the toehold bidder can bid more aggressively. In addition, there is also an indirect effect. The existence of toeholds aggravates the risk of the winner's curse for bidders without toeholds (or with toeholds that are relatively small compared to another bidder's), making them bid even less than they otherwise would have. This is because a bidder who beats a bidder with a (larger) toehold learns that the true value of the prize has been grossly over-estimated. Conversely, the risk of the winner's curse is reduced for the bidder with the largest toehold, meaning this bidder will shade her bid less than she otherwise would have. As a result, the toehold bidder is more likely to win.
Let us illustrate the effects of such toeholds using the simple model lower its license fee in order to win the contest provided that it was larger than zero. This is why company A was only able to extract a license fee of 1 per unit output.
With a toehold, company B's total profits when A charges 1 and B sets its fee equal to 0 are π(1+5). Would B have the incentive to set a licensee fee f < 0 in order to win the auction? Suppose it does set f below 0 and wins the auction. Its total profits would be equal to f + π(f+6). The first term, which measures B's licensing profits, is negative but the second term, which gives B's downstream profits, is greater than
π(1+5) or π(6). Therefore, company B will prepare to bid below 0 if π(f+6) -π(6) > -
f. That is, if the loss incurred in the licensing market is more than compensated by the increase in downstream profits. It is easy to show that this will be the case provided that a reduction in the license fee has a significant positive impact on downstream profits. 56 When that condition holds, B will bid below 0 and A will have to accept a licensee fee below 1 or risk losing the auction despite its technological superiority. This is not just theory. The importance of toeholds in auctions has been documented empirically. Betton and Eckbo (2000) have shown in a sample of 1353 tender offer contests over the period 1971-1990 that greater toeholds increase the probability of success and lower the probability of rival entry into the contest. Likewise, Walking (1985) has also shown that bidder control of target shares prior to the offer substantially increases the probability of acquiring the desired number of additional shares. Non-integrated companies may even be forced out of the relevant innovation market.
56 Mathematically, π(f+6) -π(6) = f π'(6). So condition π(f+6) -π(6) > -f van be rewritten as π'(6)
<
C. Multi-dimensional auctions
One of the most significant obstacles in applying ex-ante auctions to standard setting lies in the nature of the product being auctioned. The objects of an SSO auction are complex technologies with multiple characteristics. SSO members are typically concerned not only with the level of the royalty rate the owner of a patent asks for, but also frequently care about a range of quality parameters associated with the patented technology. Such parameters might include the ease or cost with which the technology can be implemented, the performance or processing speed, the degree of interoperability with other components, or the technical reliability. The members of an SSO will evaluate not only the financial terms of the bids from different IP holders, but also the relevant quality parameters of the respective bids. Alternative technologies will compete not only on pre-committed royalty rates, but also on the various technical benefits from using one technology rather than the alternatives.
Economic theory shows that it is very difficult to design an auction which leads to the most efficient outcome when the subject of the auction involves multiple who are privately informed about the "quality" of their products (technologies).
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Increasing quality is costly. Manelli and Vincent show that an auction where sellers bid on price only may be very inefficient. The reason is that a simple auction of that sort will allocate the trade to the bidder or bidders offering the lowest prices (will select the technology of the IP owner quoting lower royalty terms). But in their setting a low bid is associated with a product of low quality. They show that the winning bid converges to the lowest possible quality level when the number of sellers increases, and that this is unambiguously suboptimal when the contribution of quality to social surplus is large enough. Finally, they also demonstrate that sequential bargaining may yield results which are superior from a social viewpoint than those of an auction.
In practice, a number of different methods have been employed to deal with this problem as effectively as possible. For instance, procurers frequently rely on detailed request-for-quotes (RFQ) that specify minimum standards that a bidder must satisfy so that they can evaluate the bids on price only. In other cases, the buyer of a service might pre-select a small number of bidders and then negotiate on all dimensions of the service with each of them. It seems unlikely that either of these approaches would offer an efficient way to deal with auctions over a standard.
Scholars, likewise, have devised methods for multi-dimensional auctions-
where bidders not only quote prices but also compete on non-price dimensions-but they too present some problems. One such method is something referred to as the "scoring function". According to this proposal, the most straightforward way to evaluate multi-dimensional bids is to assign a score to each price/quantity combination and to rank the bids according to their scores. Applying a scoring function effectively reduces a multi-dimensional auction to a one-dimensional auction. However, it is crucial to choose a scoring function that sets the right 62 The score function was a naïve linear function of the two components of the bids, capacity and energy provision, which had an adverse incentive effect on bidders in that their bids deviated enormously from actual marginal costs.
Another solution suggested in the literature is a two stage auction meant to split the various dimensions apart. In the first stage, the firm/bidder is chosen by an auction; in the second stage bargaining over product specifications take place. The literature shows that this auction form is superior to a single stage auction (possibly with a scoring function) when bidders' valuations are correlated. 63 However, bargaining over quality in the second stage might not be feasible in the context of a SSO. Efficient bargaining requires that the buyers (the SSO members) be informed about the quality parameters of the losing bidders, allowing efficient negotiations with the winning bidder about the optimal product specifications. In the context of IP rights, the competing technologies are likely to be complex and different in nature, and the members might fail to negotiate efficiently with the patent holder. 64 The model of an ex ante auction in Swanson and Baumol works well because it concerns process innovations-i.e., technologies that facilitate reductions in the unit costs of production. This makes it simple to construct an additive scoring function: f i +c i , where f i is the license fee offered by IP owner i and c i is the unit cost of production when technology i is adopted. The winner in the auction is the one with the lowest score. Matters become much more complicated when the standard is concerned with product innovations-i.e., when technologies differ on quality dimensions which cannot be easily translated into price (license fee) equivalents.
D. Complementary patents
Another key feature of standard setting is that standards typically comprise multiple innovations, which are often protected by patents. 65 ways that are difficult to predict: Since the patents comprising a standard are complementary, the bidding behaviour of suppliers of one capability will depend on the outcome in an auction of another capability and/or on the emergence of new patents/technologies later on that will enhance the value of the standard. When the set of essential patents is known and stable, the interconnection between the various auctions need not be problematic. But when it is not, then the auction outcome may be hard to predict.
E. Uncertainty
Yet another practical complication in applying auctions to standard setting is that most standards entail a high degree of uncertainty during their development, which could lead to strong incentives to renegotiate ex post. 70 At early stages of negotiations on a standard, uncertainty will run high over which IP will be included and which technological path will be followed. During the development process, some new and superior complementary IP could arise, or the mix of patents might be different than expected at the outset. Whenever agents receive new information, though, they may want to renegotiate licensing terms agreed to before. Of course, as long as one party insists on the original contract such renegotiation is blocked, but if both parties find it profitable to renegotiate no-one can prevent them from cancelling 69 Anne Layne-Farrar et al., supra note 2. 70 Renegotiation is extensively discussed in the field of contract theory. There is usually scope for renegotiation when a contract does not cover all future eventualities (incomplete contracts). a contract or deal to agree on more favourable terms. Thus, choosing when an auction is held would be critical to limiting any wasteful renegotiations.
F. The risk of under-compensation
Because of all these problems and shortcomings, the adoption of an ex ante auction may result in serious under-compensation of productive investment and innovation. This should be a matter of great concern for regulators and antitrust Let us explain why. It is well-known that the outcome of a negotiation depends on the "exit options" available to each of the parties in the negotiation. A party with more (and more attractive) options can negotiate a better deal. 76 It is also known that legal rules can affect the exit options opened to the bargaining parties and, hence, modify the distribution of the gains for trade. 77 Consider 
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The VSO is properly cognizant of the potential for cartel outcomes with ex ante disclosure. The policy is therefore careful to state that any joint discussion of terms within the SSO is prohibited. The declarations should form the upper bound, but all specific licenses must then be negotiated bilaterally and confidentially. It remains to be seen whether the policy will work as planned, though, with terms disclosed ex ante, used for specification determination, but not discussed at any SSO the maximum disclosed terms are relied upon in the selection process. Technology A will be selected only if its technological advantage is not offset by a higher disclosed maximum royalty rate. If company A is rational and considers that company B is also likely to act rationally, it will anticipate that B will be prepared to set a very low maximum royalty rate, potentially as low as 0. Consequently, in order to be selected 79 Letter from Michael A. Lindsay, on behalf of IEEE-SA, to the DOJ, addressed to the Honourable Thomas Barnett, (Nov. 29, 2006) . 80 In addition, rather than make the maximum royalty rate and most restrictive terms mandatory for all members, the IEEE claims that it is simply encouraging members to make such declarations. The mandatory-voluntary distinction is unlikely to make any difference in practice, however, if the consequence of nondisclosure is a refusal to consider for inclusion in a standard specification a technology for which no disclosure has occurred. . 81 See Section 5383 of the IEEE-SA Standards Operation Manual, which expressly permits the discussion by working group participants to discuss "relevant costs," which may "include any potentially Essential Patent Claims." See also The structure of disclosure reinforces this dynamic: maximum terms are offered first and subsequent disclosures can only offer better terms, which provides increased pressure on lowering licensing fees to "win" inclusion in a standard. This is, of course, the outcome desired by both the VITA and IEEE because of stated concerns over the perceived abuse of ex post market power. For example, VITA noted in its letter to the DOJ that "excessive license demands can stall implementation of a final standard", but the specific instances it listed as support for this point all appear to concern a lack of adequate patent disclosure, not unreasonably high terms. 82 The IEEE concerns are even less specific and appear aimed at the mere possibility for ex post abuse, not an actual history of it.
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At the risk of being redundant, the problem with using ex ante auctions to correct for these perceived problems is the very real risk of under-compensation.
When weighed against the potential risk of ex post market power abuse, these policy changes appear to us to go too far. Member firms concerned about inadequate remuneration for their risky innovation investments are likely to be concerned about the changes in SSO disclosure policy as well. In fact, the VSO has already lost one member due to the IP policy change: Motorola has reportedly left the SSO as a result of the new term disclosure rules. 82 The DOJ's Business Review letter merely says that VITA faces royalties "higher than expected". See Letter from Robert Skitol, on behalf of VITA, to the DOJ, addressed to the Honourable Thomas Barnett, p. 4. 83 "The difficulty with the current policy is that a RAND commitment is inherently vague. It can lead to expensive litigation whose cost and risk can impede the adoption of a socially valuable standard. Even where a license negotiation does not result in litigation, the ex post negotiation of license terms (that is, negotiations occurring after a technology's inclusion in a standard has increased the patentholder's market power, potentially to the point of monopoly) can lead to higher royalty payments and ultimately higher prices to consumers." See Letter from Michael A. Lindsay, supra note 79, at 3.
V. WHITHER RAND COMMITMENTS?
Swanson and Baumol (2005) proposed a solution to the potential for ex post market power for technologies selected by standard-setting organisations: ex ante auctions sponsored by SSOs. The intuitive appeal of an ex ante auction is clear, assuming that ex post bargaining power is a problem to be solved, an assumption that may be invalid. Unfortunately, there are several reasons why SSO auctions are unlikely to deliver efficient outcomes in practice. This paper has explained them in detail.
In a nutshell, Swanson and Baumol showed that an ex ante auction would produce outcomes which are different from those of a joint buyer cartel if three assumptions were satisfied. We have explained why those assumptions are unlikely to be met in many standard-setting processes. In these cases, the ex ante auction will degenerate into a buyers' cartel. We have also shown that ex ante auctions are problematic even when those three assumptions hold. This is because SSO auctions will be characterised by incomplete information, asymmetric bidders, and multidimensional offerings. In particular, in many of those auctions, non-integrated bidders would compete with vertically integrated IP owners. We have shown that an ex ante auction design which works well when competing IP owners are all vertically integrated or all non-integrated, would not do so when there is heterogeneity among bidders. In that last case, vertically integrated bidders are likely to win the auction and/or force the non-integrated IP owners to bid very low in order to succeed. This would result in under-compensated pure innovators, reduced innovation and consumer harm.
The first and most obvious implication of our analysis is that the ex ante auction approach cannot be relied on to interpret RAND commitments in all circumstances. In many cases, as for example when technology owners differ with respect to their degree of vertical integration, these auctions are likely to undercompensate innovation to the ultimate detriment of consumers. This does not imply that ex ante market outcomes do not provide useful information in those cases. Our 31 proposal is to use it to construct a "sufficiency test" (i.e., to define a safe harbour):
evidence that ex post and ex ante licensing terms coincide would be sufficient though not necessary to establish compliance for RAND purposes.
The absence of a precise, unambiguous test (that is, a test specifying necessary and sufficient conditions) may be regarded as undesirable and seen with apprehension. First, as explained by Lichtman (2007), 84 it is precisely its vagueness what makes RAND commitments such a powerful ex ante mechanism. Imprecise RAND commitments promote competition among the implementers of a standard.
Actual negotiations take place bilaterally and confidentially, with public knowledge of the license offer no more specific than that it will be reasonable and fair. Each firm seeking a license has therefore strong incentives to negotiate the best terms it can win from the patent holder, so that its downstream operations acquire a competitive edge firms face dynamic constraints through the formal standard setting process. Because standards evolve over time, and many high technology standards pass through multiple versions -mobile telecom is on its "third generation" (3G) currently, with 3.5G, 4G, and "beyond 4G" already under development -any unreasonable pricing or abuse of market power can be punished in future iterations of the standard.
